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Abstract
Should an informed seller of multiple goods sell the best goods ﬁrst to make a favorable impres-
sion on buyers, or instead wait until buyers have learned more from earlier sales? To help answer
this question we consider the sequential auction of two goods by a seller with private information
about their values. We ﬁnd that the seller’s sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation
in the values of the goods across periods, thereby giving the seller an incentive to impress buyers
by leading with the better good. This impression eﬀect implies that selling the better good ﬁrst is
the unique equilibrium in many situations, and that selling the better good last is never a unique
equilibrium. However, if the seller could commit to a sequencing strategy, revenues would often be
higher from waiting to sell the better good last. Either sequencing strategy reveals the seller’s rank-
ing of the goods and thereby, due to the linkage principle, generates higher revenues than randomly
selling the goods or selling them simultaneously.
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Should the best or worst goods be sold ﬁrst? This question arises whenever a seller has some private
information about the quality of her goods and is concerned about the impact that early sales will
have on buyer expectations. For instance, in privatization auctions should a government sell its most
promising ﬁrms ﬁrst to create a favorable impression on investors? Or should it warm up investors
ﬁrst with less valuable ﬁrms? Similarly, should a restructuring ﬁrm that is selling oﬀ multiple units
start with the most proﬁtable or least proﬁtable ones? The traditional counsel to “put one’s best foot
forward” might seem appropriate, but so does the recommendation to “save the best for last”.
To investigate this conﬂicting advice we consider an auction where a seller has private information
about the values of two stochastically identical and independently distributed goods. We investigate the
problem from two perspectives. First, from an equilibrium perspective, if buyers believe that the seller
is leading with the better or worse good will the seller actually beneﬁt from doing so, or will the seller
prefer to fool buyers by reversing the order? Second, from a revenue-maximizing perspective, how do
the equilibrium strategies rank in terms of revenues? And if the seller could commit to any sequencing
strategy, what strategy would the seller choose?
We ﬁrst consider the simpler case where the goods are auctioned simultaneously so that no infor-
mation is released between auctions. In a simultaneous auction the equivalent of a sequencing strategy
is for the seller to reveal which of the two goods is better.1 We show that ranking the goods can be an
equilibrium in that the good which buyers believe to be ranked higher according to the seller’s strategy
is in fact the good that the seller has an incentive to rank higher. Regarding revenues, the ranking is
an informative public signal about each good’s value, so the seller’s expected revenues are higher than
if the seller randomly sold the better or worse good in either auction. This follows from the “linkage
principle” (Milgrom and Weber, 1982a) which states that publicly revealing information equalizes the
knowledge of buyers, thereby leading to more competitive bidding and higher expected revenues.
Using the simultaneous auction as a baseline, we then consider the sequential auction where one
of the two goods is sold ﬁrst. The diﬀerence is that buyers of the second period good now observe
the ﬁrst period price or other information about the ﬁrst period good. For instance, in a privatization
auction buyers of a ﬁrm sold later see the price of a ﬁrm sold ﬁrst and, if the interval between auctions
is suﬃcient, may also observe the post-privatization performance of the ﬁrst ﬁrm. Because the values of
the two goods are independently distributed, information from the ﬁrst period may seem irrelevant for
the second period good. However, we show that the seller’s sequencing strategy endogenously generates
correlation across the two auction periods by truncating the distribution of the second period good. For
instance, under a best foot forward strategy if the ﬁrst period good receives a high price then second
period buyers have some hope that the second period good is also of high quality. But if the ﬁrst period
1The ranking of goods in a simultaneous auction is examined in a pure common value context in Chakraborty, Gupta,
and Harbaugh (2002). Here we consider the more general aﬃliated values case.
1good receives a low price then second period buyers will conclude that if the ﬁrst period good was of
low quality there is even less hope for the second period good.
Because of this endogenous correlation between the ﬁrst period signal and the value of the second
period good, the seller has an incentive to strategically sequence the goods so as to make the most favor-
able impression on second period buyers. If buyers expect a best foot forward strategy, unexpectedly
selling the worse good ﬁrst will lead second period buyers to infer the second good is also low quality.
So the “impression eﬀect” from observing the ﬁrst period signal penalizes deviation from the best foot
forward strategy. But if buyers expect a best for last strategy, unexpectedly selling the better good
ﬁrst will lead second period buyers to think the second good is also high quality. So the impression
eﬀect encourages deviation from the best for last strategy. We ﬁnd that the best foot forward strategy
is always an equilibrium in the sequential auction whenever the best for last strategy is, and it is the
unique pure strategy equilibrium when the impression eﬀect is suﬃciently strong.2 Furthermore, the
best foot forward strategy is always an equilibrium in the sequential auction whenever ranking the
goods is an equilibrium in the simultaneous auction.
From a revenue perspective, a sequential auction has two advantages over a simultaneous auction.
First, by expanding the region in which ranking the goods is an equilibrium, it facilitates credible
revelation of the seller’s ordinal information. Second, the ﬁrst period information is itself a public
signal that, on average, increases the second period price in accordance with the linkage principle.
The ﬁrst period price will sometimes be high and sometimes be low with a corresponding upward or
downward impact on the second period price, but on average the impact is positive. This eﬀect has
been previously noted in cases where the values of the two goods were identical (Milgrom and Weber,
1982c) or at least correlated (Hausch, 1986), but we show that endogenous correlation induces the same
eﬀect even when the two goods are ex ante independent.
While either sequencing strategy increases expected revenues by revealing the seller’s ordinal infor-
mation and the ﬁrst period price or other information, there may be tension between the sequencing
strategy that is an equilibrium and the sequencing strategy that maximizes revenues. In particular,
since best for last is never the unique pure strategy equilibrium, a conﬂict can arise between best for
last as the revenue-maximizing strategy and best foot forward as the equilibrium strategy. In a para-
meterized example we show that expected revenues are slightly higher from the best for last strategy
even though best foot forward is the unique pure strategy equilibrium. If the seller could commit to a
strategy she would therefore choose best for last. But without commitment, best foot forward is the
only credible sequencing strategy.
Regarding privatization auctions, governments usually sequence the sale of companies over many
2The impression eﬀect has applications beyond auctions. For instance, when presenting two papers should the best
or worst paper be presented ﬁrst? If it is suﬃciently important to the presenter that the audience for the best paper
is largest, then either strategy is an equilibrium. But if the presenter just wants to maximize total attendance for the
two papers, endogenous correlation and the impression eﬀect imply that best foot forward is the unique pure strategy
equilibrium.
2years rather than following a “big bang” strategy of privatizing ﬁrms simultaneously (Roland, 2000). A
common explanation for this delay is fear of selling ﬁrms at below market value. From the perspective
of auction theory, this concern is justiﬁable because the lack of reliable public information about the
ﬁrms can give buyers substantial information rents. This paper indicates that sequential privatization
can increase revenues by credibly and publicly revealing information to all buyers, thereby reducing the
value of private information and reducing buyer information rents.3 This same logic also applies to
divestiture auctions.4 The restructuring literature has shown that the decision to sell assets implies
information about both the value of the assets and the value of the remaining ﬁrm (Nanda, 1991). Our
paper shows that, when multiple assets are sold, the sequencing decision also reveals information about
the relative values of the assets. This information will decrease the expected price of one asset and
increase the expected price of the other, but on average will increase revenues.
Sequencing strategies oﬀer insight into the “declining price anomaly” or “afternoon eﬀect” in which
the prices for seemingly equivalent goods fall during the course of a sequential auction (Ashenfelter,
1989). Such declines have been observed in a wide range of environments, including privatization sales
spread over many years (Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999). The phenomenon appears inconsistent both with the
law of one price which states that arbitrage should ensure uniform prices, and with the result from
auction theory that public information about bids in earlier auctions of identical goods should lead to
rising prices due to the linkage principle (Milgrom and Weber, 1982c). Possible explanations for the
anomaly include risk aversion (McAfee and Vincent, 1993), complementarities between goods (Branco,
1997; Menezes and Montiero, 1999), a declining number of bidders for later goods (Engelbrecht-Wiggans,
1994), auction participation costs (von der Fehr, 1994), moral hazard by agents bidding on behalf of
clients (Ginsbergh, 1998), and special auction rules in which the winner can purchase additional units
at the same price (Black and de Meza, 1992) or can choose her preferred item (Gale and Hausch, 1994).
Our approach provides a simple explanation of this eﬀect: prices fall because the quality of the second
good is on average lower than the ﬁrst good based on the seller’s private information. Under the best
foot forward strategy we ﬁnd that the negative eﬀect on the second period price due to lower quality
will outweigh the positive impact on that price due to the linkage principle, and thereby ensure a decline
in prices.
Previous analyses of strategic sequencing consider the case where the goods are known to be diﬀerent
based on public information. Benoit and Krishna (2000) show in a complete information environment
that leading with the better good maximizes revenue when buyers have budget constraints and act
strategically across auctions. Bernhardt and Scoones (1994) consider a private value auction in which
3Consistent with the impression eﬀect that favors a best foot forward strategy, empirical evidence from Gupta, Ham,
and Svejnar (2000) shows that in the mass privatization programs undertaken in the Czech Republic more proﬁtable ﬁrms
were auctioned ﬁrst. If the better ﬁrms are indeed sold ﬁrst, then evaluation studies need to control for this selection bias
to correctly estimate the gains from privatization.
4In a sample of divestitures in the 1989-1998 period, Boone and Mulherin (2002) ﬁnd that, contrary to much of the
discussion in the restructuring literature, auctions are a common selling mechanism.
3t h ev a r i a n c eo fb u y e rv a l u a t i o n sd i ﬀers between two goods and ﬁnd that the good with highest variance
should be sold ﬁrst. Beggs and Graddy (1997) ﬁnd that selling the best good ﬁrst maximizes revenues
when each buyer’s private valuation for one good is a multiple of their valuation of the other and
buyers demand only one good. Baba (1998) ﬁnds similar results under the weaker condition that buyer
valuations are supermodular in the buyer’s signal and the seller’s signal. McMillan (1994) notes that
the issue of whether to sell rights for large or small regions ﬁrst was considered in designing spectrum
auctions in the U.S., with one factor being that the linkage principle favored a small to large sequence.
Our analysis diﬀers from the previous literature in that the seller makes a sequencing decision based on
her own private information. The sequencing strategy can therefore play a role in credibly (although,
imperfectly) revealing this information to buyers.5
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple example that illustrates the impression
eﬀect. Section 3 introduces the general auction model. Section 4 considers a simultaneous auction so
as to analyze the simplest environment that supports rank-revealing strategies. Section 5 considers a
sequential auction to see how the impression eﬀect of observing information from the ﬁrst period good
aﬀects the credibility of and revenues from sequencing strategies. It also analyzes the declining price
anomaly. Section 6 presents an expanded example that illustrates the key ﬁndings. Section 7 concludes
the paper and the Appendix contains most of the proofs.
2 An Introductory Example
The endogenous correlation generated by the seller’s sequencing strategy, and the resulting impression
eﬀect, can be seen in a simple common value auction in which buyers do not have any private information
so there are no information rents. Assume two ex ante identical goods, a and b, are sold in two periods
by a seller who observes the actual values, Va and Vb, of the goods. The goods are independently
distributed with support in {0,1}, and Pr[Vi =0 ]=P r [ Vi =1 ]=1
2 for i = a,b. There are two diﬀerent
groups of two or more identical buyers in each period. Buyers in the ﬁrst period bid the expected value
of the good conditional on the seller’s strategy and buyers in the second period bid the expected value
of the good conditional on both the seller’s strategy and the observed value of the ﬁrst good. Let V1
represent the value of the good sold ﬁrst and V2 the value of the good sold second.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of values conditional on the seller’s sequencing strategy.6 Consider
the best foot forward strategy of leading with whichever good is better when Va 6= Vb.I fe i t h e rVa =1o r
Vb =1t h eﬁr s tp e r i o dg o o di se x p e c t e dt ob eh i g hv a l u es o , based on these expectations and regardless
5In many auctions the goods are likely to diﬀe rb a s e do nb o t hp u b l i ci n f o r m a t i o na n dthe seller’s private information,
thereby representing a mix of previous models and our model. While additional issues are raised by such a mix, the role
of the sequencing strategy in credibly revealing ordinal information, and the potential for conﬂict between equilibrium
and revenue-maximizing strategies, remain as long as the seller has any private information.
6The correlation coeﬃcient between V1 and V2 is ρ = 1
3 in both cases. With binary values non-negative correlation is
equivalent to aﬃliation, which is the basis for the theoretical results in the next section.
4Figure 1: Endogenous correlation from sequencing strategies
of what the seller actually does, the ﬁrst period price is Pr[V1 =1 ]=3
4. Now consider the impact on
t h es e c o n dp e r i o dp r i c eo fe i t h e rf o l l o w i n gt h eb e s tf oot forward strategy or deviating from it. If the
seller follows the strategy then second period buyers observe that a high value good was sold in the
ﬁrst period, so the second period price is Pr[V2 =1 |V1 =1 ]=1
3. If instead the seller deviates and leads
with the worse good then, expecting a best foot forward strategy, second period buyers will infer that
if the ﬁrst good was low value the second good must also be low value, so the second period price is
Pr[V2 =1 |V1 = 0] = 0. Since deviation is not proﬁtable best foot forward is an equilibrium.7
It may seem that the problem is symmetric and best for last is also an equilibrium. Checking, buyers
believe the ﬁrst period good is high value only if both goods are high value so the ﬁrst period price is
Pr[V1 =1 ]=1
4. If the seller follows the best for last strategy then second period buyers observe that
a low value good was sold in the ﬁrst period, so the second period price is Pr[V2 =1 |V1 =0 ]=2
3.
However if the seller deviates and leads with the better good then the second period buyers believe
the second good must also be of high value so the price is Pr[V2 =1 |V1 = 1] = 1. Since deviation is
proﬁtable, best for last is not an equilibrium.
The seller wants to make a favorable impression even though goods a and b are independent because
the seller’s sequencing strategy endogenously generates correlation across the two periods by truncating
the distribution of the second period good. As shown formally in the following sections, this intuition
carries over to a more general information environment in which the seller need not be perfectly informed,
the buyers have private information that may be stronger than that of the seller, the good has diﬀering
values to diﬀerent buyers, and second period buyers observe only a noisy signal of the value of the ﬁrst
period good such as its price.
7We have ignored the cases where both goods are high or low value and the seller just randomizes. Adding these cases
the expected payoﬀ from sticking to best foot forward is 3/4+( 1 /4)(1/3) + (1/2)(1/3) + (1/4)0 = 1 and the expected
payoﬀ from deviating is 3/4+( 1 /4)(1/3) + (1/2)0 + (1/4)0 = 5/6.
53 The Model
We construct a standard auction model based on Milgrom and Weber (1982a) which includes both
common value and private value features. As in their model, the seller and the buyers all have some
private information. Distinct from their model, the seller can choose which of two goods to sell ﬁrst
based on her private information. This has two main implications when the seller follows a pure strategy
of leading with the best or worst good. First, the fact that a good is sold in a particular period reveals the
relative magnitude of the seller’s signal for the good. Second, the endogenous correlation induced by the
sequencing strategy implies information from the ﬁrst period can be used to predict the seller’s second
period signal. For instance, observing the ﬁrst period price reveals to second period buyers how highly
buyers valued the ﬁrst good, thereby giving an indication of the seller’s signal for the ﬁrst good and, due
to the endogenous correlation, of the seller’s signal for the second good. Disentangling the impact of
these two sources of information will help us understand both the equilibrium and revenue-maximizing
strategies. We set up our formal model below.
Goods, Signals & Values There is one seller who sells two goods indexed by k ∈ {a,b}.F o re a c h
good k the seller observes a private signal Sk ∈ {H,L} ⊂ R, where H>L .The seller can therefore tell
if good k is likely to be above average (Sk = H) or below average (Sk = L) but nothing more.8 This
information is soft in the sense that the seller cannot credibly reveal it, even though she may like to,
except through the sequencing strategy. Let Pr[Sk = H]=λ ∈ (0,1).
We suppose that for each good k there is a group of n ≥ 2b u y e r s . 9 The n buyers also observe private
signals of the quality of the goods, Xik ∈ X ⊂ R for i ∈ {1,...,n}.W ed e n o t eb yXk =( X1k,...,Xnk)
the vector of buyer signals for good k. For j =1 ,...,n, let Zjk be the j-th highest signal among the n
signals of the buyers of good k with Zk being the vector, and let Y
j
ik be the j-th highest signal of the
bidders other than i with Yik being the vector.
We suppose that the random variables (Xk,S k) associated with good k are independently and
identically distributed across k ∈ {a,b}. To simplify notation, throughout the paper we use f(·)t o
represent densities and f(·|·) to represent conditional densities. In particular, let f(x,s)d e n o t et h e
joint density of (Xk,S k)w i t hs u p p o r to nXn×{H,L}. We assume that the likelihood ratio
f(Xk|H)
f(Xk|L)of
the conditional densities of Xk given Sk is bounded away from zero and inﬁnity.10 Furthermore, following
8By limiting the seller’s signal space we can restrict attention to the simplest and most intuitive sequencing strategies.
When S has more than two elements (for example, S is a continuum) the seller could have more complicated strategies
such as selling the better good ﬁrst only if the gap between signals is suﬃciently large.
9For simplicity we assume that there are diﬀerent buyers for each good. This would be appropriate if, for instance,
a government privatizes ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries, or a restructuring ﬁrm sells oﬀ unrelated units. The assumption
precludes such strategies as underbidding for the ﬁrst good so as to lower other buyers’ expectations for the second good
(Hausch, 1986). It also prevents the buyer of the ﬁrst good from acquiring an information advantage when bidding for
the second good (Luton and McAfee, 1986).
10The bounded likelihood ratio assumption implies that buyers are never certain of the seller’s information given their
6Milgrom and Weber (1982a) we assume that the distribution of the buyers’ private signals does not
depend upon the identity of the buyers, or f(x,s) is symmetric in its ﬁrst n arguments, and that f(x,s)
displays aﬃliation. Aﬃliation implies that if one player (including the seller) observes a high private
signal of the value of a good, other players are also more likely to observe high private signals of the
value of that good. In particular it implies that the likelihood ratio above is non—decreasing in each
argument.11
We assume that for each good k there exists a function V : Xn×{H,L} → R, non-decreasing in its
ﬁrst n arguments and strictly increasing in its last argument, such that the value of good k to buyer
i is given by Vik = V (Xik,{Xi0k}i06=i,S k) for each buyer i and for each Xk and Sk.S i n c e b u y e r s a r e
symmetric, the valuations of all buyers for good k depend on the seller’s signal in the same way, and
the valuation of each buyer depends on the signals of the other buyers {Xi0k}i06=i in the same way and
does not depend on the identity of the other buyers.12 Let Vk =( V1k,...,Vnk) be the vector of buyer
valuations for good k. Under our assumptions of aﬃliation and the monotonicity of the function V (·),
the random variables (Vk,X k,S k)a r ea ﬃliated as shown in Milgrom and Weber (1982a). Note that the
joint density f(v,x,s)o f( Vk,X k,S k) is also distributed i.i.d. across k.
Seller’s Strategies and the Timing Structure For a seller with signals Sk = H and Sk0 = L
where k 6= k0, the possible sequencing strategies are to sell the good with the high signal ﬁrst (best foot
forward or BFF strategy), to sell the good with the low signal ﬁr s t( b e s tf o rl a s to rB F Ls t r a t e g y )o r
to randomize (mixed strategy). When the signalsf o rt h et w og o o d sa r ei d e n t i c a lt h es e l l e ri si n d i ﬀerent
about the sequencing strategy so that leading with either good is strategically equivalent and we allow
the seller to randomize.13
We assume that the buyers in the second auction observe the ﬁrst period price. We also allow for
the possibility that the second period buyers observe other more informative public signals about the
good sold in the ﬁrst period. For example, the second period buyers in a privatization auction might
observe the post-privatization performance of the ﬁrm sold in the ﬁrst period.
Our primary interest is the sequential auction with the following timing structure: (1) The seller
observes her signals and decides which good to sell ﬁrst. (2) The buyers of the good the seller sells ﬁrst
note that their good is being sold ﬁrst, observe their private signals, and bid for the good. (3) The
buyers of the good the seller sells second note that their good is being sold second, observe their private
signals, observe the ﬁrst period public signals relating to the ﬁrst period good, and bid for the good. For
own signal and so precludes the need to consider oﬀ-equilibrium-path beliefs.
11Milgrom and Weber (1982a) provide a more extensive discussion of aﬃliation and its implications.
12As in Milgrom and Weber (1982a) this formulation allows for the possibility of pure common values, where Vik = Vk
for all i. It also allows for a private value component for each buyer, so that buyers may not agree on value even if all
private signals are made public.
13Strategies that condition on the names of the goods, such as selling good a ﬁrst if the signals are the same and good
b ﬁrst otherwise, are not considered.
7comparison we will also consider a simultaneous auction which is identical except that buyers of the
“second” good do not receive any additional information regarding the ﬁrst good.
Equilibrium We assume that the identical buyers for each good play a symmetric Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium of the auction given their correct beliefs about the seller’s strategies and their information,
and that the seller’s strategy is sequentially rational given the buyers’ beliefs.
The Auction, Prices and Bids We suppose that in each period the seller employs an English
auction to sell the good.14,15 Notice from the timing structure above that, even for a ﬁxed auction
mechanism, the auctions in the two periods are diﬀerent because the buyers may believe that the seller
is treating the two periods diﬀerently via her sequencing strategy and because the second period buyers
observe additional signals from the ﬁrst period, e.g., the price. However, because of the symmetry in
the model (including the seller’s strategies), the auction for each good k is identical. To exploit this
symmetry, we will focus on the auction for each good k throughout our analysis.
In our model, in addition to their private signals Xk, there are a number of possible public signals
that buyers of good k might receive. The ﬁrst of these is the period in which good k is sold, denoted
by Tk ∈ {τH,τ L},τ H >τ L. To illustrate, suppose that buyers believe that the seller is following a BFF
strategy. Then, if good k is sold in the ﬁrst period buyers in that period believe that Sk =m a x {Sa,S b};
whereas, if good k is sold in the second period then buyers of good k believe that Sk =m i n {Sa,S b}.16
The variable Tk indicates the public signal that buyers of good k receive from observing the period in
which good k is sold:
Tk = τH ⇒ Sk =m a x {Sa,S b}
Tk = τL ⇒ Sk =m i n {Sa,S b}.
The variable Tk is an ordinal signal that partially reveals the seller’s private information Sk and that
captures the pure rank eﬀect of the seller’s strategy. When the buyers believe that the the seller is
following the BFF (respectively, the BFL) strategy, the buyers of good k receive the signal τH when
good k is sold in the ﬁrst (respectively, the second) period, and receive the signal τL when good k is
sold in the second (respectively, the ﬁrst) period. We will denote by Pk(Xk,T k) the price of good k as
a function of private and public signals when the only public signal that the buyers of good k receive is
Tk.
14More precisely, we consider an ascending bid auction where the price rises continuously and each bidder has to decide
when to drop out from the auction after observing the number of active bidders and when other bidders have dropped
out. Drop—outs are ﬁnal. See Milgrom and Weber (1982a).
15We do not consider reserve prices and entry fees. More generally, we do not consider mechanism design issues but
instead take the selling mechanism as given.
16Symmetric remarks apply when the buyers believe that the seller will follow a BFL strategy.
8In addition to the signal Tk, buyers of good k are also allowed to observe additional signals Ψk0
aﬃliated with the seller’s signal Sk0 for good k0 that is sold in the ﬁrst period. For example, this could
be the ﬁrst period price Pk0 that the seller obtains for good k0. Notice that even though all signals
associated with the two goods are independently drawn, the price Pk0 is correlated with the seller’s
signal for good k0 and so, via the seller’s sequencing strategy, it is correlated with the seller’s signal for
good k. As a result, the price Pk0 is relevant information for buyers of good k, as long as the buyers
believe that the seller is conditioning her sequencing strategy on her private information. Furthermore,
due to independence, the seller’s sequencing strategy is the only channel through which the auctions
for the two goods are related. We will denote by Pk(Xk,T k,Ψk0) the price of good k as a function of
private and public signals when buyers of good k receive the signal Ψk0 in addition to the signal Tk.
For any bidder i, and realizations Xik = x, Y
j
ik = yj for j =1 ,...,n − 1, and Tk = τ deﬁne the
function vk(·)a s
vk(x,y1,...,yn−1,τ)=E[Vik|Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1,T k = τ]. (1)
Further, for any realization Ψk0 = ψ deﬁne the function v∗
k(·)a s
v∗
k(x,y1,...,yn−1,τ,ψ)=E[Vik|Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1,T k = τ,Ψk0 = ψ]. (2)
Note that due to our symmetry assumptions, neither vk(·)n o rv∗
k(·)d e p e n do nt h ei d e n t i t yo ft h e
bidder. From Milgrom and Weber (1982a), the bidder with the highest signal will win the auction and
pay a price equal to the bid of the second highest bidder. The second highest bidder’s bid will equal the
expected value of the good given that he is tied for the highest bid after observing n − 2 bidders with
the lowest signals drop out (thereby inferring their signals Z3k,...,Znk), and given the public signals Tk
and Ψk0. As a result, the price Pk(Xk,T k) can be written as
Pk(Xk,T k)=vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,T k)( 3 )
while the price Pk(Xk,T k,Ψk0) can be written as
Pk(Xk,T k,Ψk0)=v∗
k(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,T k,Ψk0). (4)
4 Simultaneous Auction
Sequencing aﬀects buyer information via the period in which a good is sold and the release of ﬁrst period
price or other ﬁrst period information. To understand the impact on equilibrium strategies, we start by
considering the case where buyers do not observe the ﬁrst period price or any other information about
the ﬁrst auction. Without such information, the only public signal that the buyers of good k receive is
the period signal Tk. Therefore this case is just a simultaneous auction where the “period” could be,
for instance, the room that the good is auctioned in rather than the time that it is auctioned. Since the
9two pure strategies BFF and BFL are identical subject to renaming the periods, we will refer to either
strategy as a “rank-revealing strategy”. Such a strategy is credible if the seller has an incentive to sell
the better good when buyers expect it to be sold rather than to deviate and trick the buyers.
For a seller with one high signal and one low signal,17 the symmetry between goods k and k0 implies
that the expected revenues from following a rank-revealing strategy are higher than from deviating if
and only if
E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = H]+E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = L] ≥
E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = H]+E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = L].
(5)
Our ﬁrst proposition provides suﬃcient conditions on the primitives of the model under which a rank-
revealing strategy is an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If
V (x1,...,x n,H) − V (x1,...,xn,L) is non-decreasing in x1,...,xn (ID)
then there exists λ ∈ (0,1) such that if λ ≤ λ a rank-revealing strategy is an equilibrium of the simulta-
neous auction.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The increasing diﬀerences condition (ID) implies that the seller’s signal and the buyers’ signals
are complements in determining buyer valuations. Note that supermodularity of V in its arguments
is equivalent to (ID). Intuitively, when the condition holds, buyers bid more aggressively when they
are optimistic about the seller’s signal, so the seller should then sell her better good when buyers are
expecting her to.
I nac o m m o nv a l u ea u c t i o nw i t haperfectly informed seller the diﬀerence (ID) reduces to just H−L so
the condition always holds. In aﬃliated values auctions, additive or multiplicative separability of buyer
values in the seller’s information and the buyers’ own information is suﬃcient for (ID) to hold. Such
separability can occur when the seller has information on a common component and the individual
buyers have information on a private component. For instance, additive separability could arise in
divestiture auctions of two units if buyers for each unit have a private signal about how well they could
manage the unit, the divesting ﬁrm knows the general productivity of each unit, and proﬁtability of a
unit is an additive function of both factors. Multiplicative separability could occur in a privatization
auction of two ﬁrms in separate industries if the buyers for each ﬁrm have a private signal about the
ﬁrm’s proﬁtabililty and the government knows the likely tax rates in the two industries.
Irrespective of whether a rank-revealing strategy equilibrium exists, it is easy to see that there is
always a mixed strategy equilibrium where the buyers do not believe that the seller’s strategy reveals
any information so the seller in fact sells either good ﬁrst with probability 1
2 regardless of Sa and Sb.
17When the seller receives identical signals, there is no strategic decision to be made as the seller is indiﬀerent between
sequencing choices, and we assume that, in equilibrium, the seller sells either good ﬁrst with probability 1
2.
10Compared to the mixed strategy equilibrium, the rank-revealing strategy equilibrium yields the seller
higher revenues. This follows from the linkage principle. For each good k, the “period” in which the
good is sold is informative for the buyers as it tells them whether the seller’s signal Sk for the good is
the maximum or the minimum of two independent draws. We state this as our next result.
Proposition 2 A rank-revealing strategy generates higher expected revenues than the mixed strategy in
the simultaneous auction.
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 12, Milgrom and Weber (1982a).
Revealing seller information beneﬁts the seller on average, but clearly the incentive to exaggerate
makes direct statements about the value of the goods non-credible. Proposition 1 shows that in some
cases the seller can credibly reveal ordinal information about the goods,18 and Proposition 2 shows that
even this limited information increases expected revenues.
5S e q u e n t i a l A u c t i o n
Now consider the impact of observing the ﬁrst period price or other information from the ﬁrst period
auction. If buyers believe the seller follows either pure strategy, a high ﬁrst period price raises the
probability that the seller received two high signals, and therefore raises the estimated value of the
second period good for each buyer. The ﬁrst period price is more likely to be high when the good with
the highest signal is sold in the ﬁrst period since ﬁrst period buyers are more likely to observe high
private signals and bid correspondingly when the seller’s signal is high. We call the impact of observing
ﬁrst period information the “impression eﬀect”.
Lemma 1 For both the best foot forward and best for last strategies, when good k is sold in the second
period, observation of the ﬁrst period signal Ψk0 by second period buyers raises (lowers) the expected
second period price if the seller sells a good with a high (low) signal Sk0 in the ﬁrst period: for all
τ ∈ {τH,τ L} and each value s ∈ {H,L} of Sk,
E[Pk(Xk,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0 = H,Sk = s] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ)|Sk = s] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0 = L,Sk = s]. (6)
Proof. In the Appendix.
The proof depends on the aﬃliation between the ﬁrst period public signal Ψk0 and the ﬁrst period
seller signal Sk0, the independence between goods k and k0, the endogenous correlation between the ﬁrst
and second period seller signals, and the aﬃliation between the second period buyer signals and the
second period seller signal. The lemma therefore holds for the special case where second period buyers
observe only the ﬁrst period price, Ψk0 = Pk0.
18Chakraborty, Gupta, and Harbaugh (2002) show that in common value simultaneous auctions some ordinal informa-
tion can always be revealed if the number of goods is large enough.
11Corollary 1 If buyers of good k only observe the ﬁrst period price Pk0 which is aﬃliated with Xk0 and
Sk0 then for all τ ∈ {τH,τ L}, and each value s ∈ {H,L} of Sk,
E[Pk(Xk,τ,P k0)|Sk0 = H,Sk = s] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ)|Sk = s] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ,P k0)|Sk0 = L,Sk = s]. (7)
Proof. Follows analogously from the proof of the lemma.
If, as in the simultaneous auction, the ﬁrst period price is not observed the best foot forward and best
for last strategies are equivalent so either both are equilibria or neither are equilibria. The impression
eﬀect adds a boost in favor of the best foot forward strategy and against the best for last strategy,
implying that the equilibrium condition for the former is always less strict than that for the latter.
Thus whenever best for last is an equilibrium best foot forward must also be an equilibrium, but not
the converse. One equilibrium which always exists is where the seller plays a mixed strategy of randomly
sequencing the sale of the goods. If buyers expect such randomization the seller is indiﬀerent between
sequencing strategies because the ﬁrst period price conveys no information.
Proposition 3 ( i )T h ee q u i l i b r i u mc o n d i t i o nf o rb e s tf o o tf o r w a r d( b e s tf o rl a s t )i sl e s s( m o r e )s t r i c t
than the equilibrium condition for a rank-revealing strategy in the simultaneous auction. (ii) Best foot
forward is an equilibrium whenever best for last is but not the converse. (iii) The mixed strategy is
always an equilibrium.
Proof. Using the symmetry between good k and good k0, the equilibrium condition for the BFF can
be written as,
E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = H]+E[Pk(Xk,τ L,Ψk0)|Sk0 = H,Sk = L]
≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = L]+E[Pk(Xk,τ L,Ψk0)|Sk0 = L,Sk = H]( 8 )
and that for the BFL strategy can be written as
E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = L]+E[Pk(Xk,τ H,Ψk0)|Sk0 = L,Sk = H]
≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = H]+E[Pk(Xk,τ H,Ψk0)|Sk0 = H,Sk = L]. (9)
The proof of (i) follows from the lemma by observing that the left-hand side of (8) is greater than the
left-hand side of (5) while the right-hand side of (8) is less than the right-hand side of (5), and similarly
that the left-hand side of (9) is less than the left-hand side of (5) while the right-hand side of (9) is
greater than the right-hand side of (5). The proof of (ii) then follows directly. The proof of (iii) follows
from the fact that if the buyers believe that the seller does not condition the sequencing decision on
her information then, for each realization of her signals, all sequencing strategies for the seller yield the
same expected revenues.
The ﬁrst part of this proposition implies that best foot forward is an equilibrium if (5) holds and
that best foot forward is the unique pure strategy equilibrium if (5) holds with equality. More generally,
12the existence and uniqueness of the best foot forward equilibrium will depend on the distribution of
buyer signals, seller signals, and buyer valuations in a non-trivial way.19 Clearly, the more powerful is
the impression eﬀect, the more likely it is that the best foot forward strategy is the unique pure strategy
equilibrium. The extreme case is where the seller is fully informed of the goods’ values and the seller’s
ﬁrst period signal is fully revealed. This situation was examined in the introductory example for a
parameterized case where buyers did not have informative signals. It was found that best foot forward
was the unique pure strategy equilibrium. In fact, this result also holds when buyers have informative
signals.
Proposition 4 In a common value auction where the seller is perfectly informed, Vk = Sk,a n dt h e
seller’s signal is revealed between periods, Ψk0 = Sk0, best foot forward is an equilibrium and is the
unique pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Under the BFF strategy if the ﬁrst period seller signal is L then buyers will infer the second
period seller signal is also L. Therefore, for Ψk0 = L, the second period price is E[Pk(Xk,τ L,L)|Sk0 =
L,Sk = H]=L. So the equilibrium condition for BFF simpliﬁes to
E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = H]+E[Pk(Xk,τ L,H)|Sk0 = H,Sk = L] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = L]+L (10)
which holds since aﬃliation implies E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = H] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ H)|Sk = L]a n ds i n c eVk =
Sk ∈ {L,H} implies E[Pk(Xk,τ L,H)|Sk0 = H,Sk = L] ≥ L. Conversely, under the BFL strategy
E[Pk(Xk,τ H,H)|Sk0 = H,Sk = L]=H. So the condition for BFL simpliﬁes to
E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = L]+E[Pk(Xk,τ H,L)|Sk0 = L,Sk = H] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = H]+H (11)
which does not hold since aﬃliation implies E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = L] ≤ E[Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk = H] and since
Vk = Sk ∈ {L,H} implies E[Pk(Xk,τ H,L)|Sk0 = L,Sk = H] <H .
We now turn to the impression eﬀect on seller revenues. Information from the ﬁrst period provides
additional information regarding the realization of the seller’s signal in the second period. By the
linkage principle the expected revenues from the best foot forward or best for last strategy are therefore
higher when buyers observe ﬁrst period information compared to the simultaneous auction. On the
other hand, for the mixed strategy the expected rev e n u e sw i l lb et h es a m ef o rt h es i m u l t a n e o u sa n d
sequential auctions because, due to the independent values of the two goods, information about good
k0 contains no information for the buyers of good k since the seller does not condition the sequencing
on her information. We collect these results into our next proposition.
Proposition 5 (i) Both pure strategies in the sequential auction generate higher expected revenues
than a rank-revealing strategy in the simultaneous auction. (ii) The mixed strategy generates the same
expected revenues in the sequential and simultaneous auctions.
19Note from Propositions 1 and 3(i) that the suﬃcient conditions on the primitives for the existence of a rank—revealing
equilibrium for the simultaneous case are also suﬃcient for the existence of a BFF equilibrium.
13Proof. Follows from the discussion above and Theorem 12 in Milgrom and Weber (1982a).
A natural question is whether the expected revenues from best foot forward and best for last can be
unambiguously ranked. Under the best foot forward strategy the ﬁrst period price signal is more likely
to carry positive information about the second period good. However, under the best for last strategy
t h em o r ev a l u a b l eg o o di ss o l di nt h es e c o n dp e r i o dwhen this information has been released, thereby
reducing buyer information rents for the more valuable good. Consequently, the revenues from either
strategy may be higher and a conﬂict can arise between equilibrium and revenue-maximizing strategies
if the best for last strategy yields higher revenues but is not an equilibrium.20 In Section 6 we provide
an example where best foot forward is an equilibrium and best for last is not, but best for last yields
higher revenues.
To conclude this section we now turn to a discussion of expected prices across periods under the
diﬀerent pure strategies. Empirical evidence indicates that the prices of seemingly identical goods often
fall during the course of a sequential auction. While a number of diﬀerent approaches have been taken
to explain this anomaly, they are focused primarily on buyer characteristics and strategies. We ﬁnd that
the “afternoon eﬀect” can also arise endogenously out of the seller’s choice of an equilibrium sequencing
strategy. Even though all signals related to the two goods are identically and independently distributed,
prices are correlated over time. As the next result shows, when the seller employs the best foot forward
strategy, prices fall simply because on average the second good is of lower value than the ﬁrst good
based on the seller’s private information. This negative eﬀect outweighs the positive eﬀect on second
period prices from the linkage principle.21
Proposition 6 (i) Under the best foot forward strategy the expected ﬁrst period price is higher than the
expected second period price:
E[Pk(Xk,τ H)] ≥ E[Pk(Xk,τ L,Ψk0)]. (12)
(ii) Under the best for last strategy the expected ﬁrst period price is lower than the expected second period
price:
E[Pk(Xk,τ L)] ≤ E[Pk(Xk,τ H,Ψk0)]. (13)
(iii) Under the mixed strategy the expected ﬁrst period price is equal to the expected second period price.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Note that in this model the afternoon eﬀect does not imply violation of the law of one price. When
good k is better based on the seller’s information it sells in the ﬁrst period at a higher average price
than good k0, but unconditional on the seller’s private information both goods sell at the same expected
price.
20When neither best foot forward nor best for last is an equilibrium then there is also a conﬂict since either strategy
generates higher revenues than the mixed strategy.
21The proof relies on the independence of the valuations of the two goods a and b. If the valuations were suﬃciently
correlated the linkage principle’s eﬀect could be dominant.
14Figure 2: Percent revenue gain from following strategy vs. deviating, BFF and BFL
6A n E x a m p l e
This section expands on the initial example of Section 2 by allowing buyers to have private information
and by allowing the seller signal to be noisy. We consider the case where the impression eﬀect is the
weakest in that second period buyers only observe the ﬁrst period price rather than a more informative
signal of the ﬁrst period good’s value. In privatization and divestiture auctions, assets are typically sold
over a period of many years so buyers interested in assets sold later are likely to see highly informative
signals regarding the values of assets sold earlier.
As in the earlier example, Vk ∈ {0,1} where Pr[Vk =1 ]=1
2 for k ∈ {a,b}. Regarding the seller’s
signal Sk ∈ {L,H},l e t




for k ∈ {a,b}. Note that the signal is uninformative when α = 1
2. For each good there are n =2b u y e r s
who each receive a noisy binary signal of the quality of the good being sold in that period, Xk ∈ {L,H},
where




for k ∈ {a,b}. For simplicity we assume that the buyer and seller signals are independent conditional
on the value of the good. We continue to use an English auction, which with two bidders is equivalent
to a second-price auction.
First considering equilibrium strategies, in this example ranking the goods in the simultaneous
auction is an equilibrium for λ =P r [ Vk =1 ]≤ 1
2, and the seller is just indiﬀerent for λ = 1
2. Therefore
for our case of λ = 1
2 the impression eﬀect implies that best foot forward is the unique pure strategy
15equilibrium in the sequential auction.22 Figure 2 graphs expected revenue from following the candidate
equilibrium strategy minus expected revenue from deviating as a percent of the latter when β varies
from 1
2 t o1w h i l eα is ﬁxed at 0.95. The top line shows that the seller beneﬁts from sticking to the BFF
strategy while the bottom line shows that the seller loses from sticking to the BFL strategy. Note that
when β is very low the ﬁrst period price provides no information to second period buyers and when β is
very high second period buyers are so well informed that ﬁrst period price information is redundant.23
At either extreme the sequencing strategy is irrelevant since the impression eﬀect of the ﬁrst period
price disappears.
Regarding revenue-maximizing strategies, Proposition 5 states that revenues from either the BFF
or BFL strategies should be higher than those from the mixed strategy because the sequencing strategy
and the ﬁrst period price publicly reveal information. Since BFF is an equilibrium for all parameter
values, the BFF strategy can credibly reveal seller information to buyers. In this example the revenue
gain from either pure strategy relative to the mixed strategy is increasing in α and reaches a peak
when β is about 3
4. For low values of β neither buyer has much information while for high values of β
both buyers have highly correlated information. The gains from reducing buyer information rents are
therefore highest for intermediate values of β where these rents are largest. For α = .95 and β = 3
4,t h e
revenue gain from BFF relative to the mixed strategy is about 7%. For all parameter values BFL oﬀers
slightly higher revenues than BFF, but since BFL is not an equilibrium so the seller will have diﬃculty
committing to the strategy.
From Proposition 6 we know that the expected second period price is lower than the expected ﬁrst
period price when the seller follows the best foot forward strategy. Figure 3 shows this afternoon eﬀect
when α and β j o i n t l yv a r yf r o m1
2 to 1. For α = β = 1
2 the seller’s signal is completely uninformative
so the buyers bid the unconditional expected value of 1
2 in each period. As the informativeness of the
seller’s signal increases, the expected values of the goods diverge, with the expected value of the ﬁrst
good (labelled as E[V1]) increasing linearly to 3
4 and the expected value of the second good (labelled as
E[V2]) decreasing linearly to 1
4. The expected prices for the two periods (labelled as E[P1]a n dE[P2])
do not follow this pattern exactly due to the buyers’ information rents. Although the information rents
are smaller for the second good due to the linkage principle, as seen by the smaller gap between E[V2]
and E[P2] than between E[V1]a n dE[P1], the expected prices decline between periods for all parameter
values. If the two goods were identical, rather than just stochastically equivalent, the linkage principle
22Recall that the incentive to follow BFF and deviate from BFL was stronger in the introductory example because the
seller was perfectly informed (α = 1) and the actual seller signal from the ﬁrst period, rather than just the price, was
revealed in the second period. In fact, from Proposition 4, under those assumptions BFF is the unique pure strategy
equilibrium for any λ and any β.
23 The pictured asymmetry between the gains from following BFF and the losses from following BFL arises because the
English auction format makes a high price in the ﬁrst period price a particularly strong signal of second period quality
when buyers expect the seller to follow BFL. The incentive to deviate from BFL is therefore stronger than the incentive
to follow BFF.
16Figure 3: Declining price pattern under BFF strategy
would imply the opposite pattern of rising prices (Milgrom and Weber, 1982c).
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that sequencing is an important strategic decision in the auction of multiple goods even
when the goods are ex ante independent. Leading with either the better or worse good endogenously
generates correlation across periods so evidence of a high quality good in the ﬁrst period, such as a
high price, makes a positive impression on second period buyers. When the impression eﬀect is strong
enough, leading with the better good is the unique pure strategy equilibrium. Either strategy reveals the
seller’s private information about the relative proﬁtability of the goods. Since this ordinal information
is credible when the sequencing strategy is an equilibrium, revenues increase in accordance with the
linkage principle.
The issue of how to credibly reveal ordinal information is more general than sequential auctions
(Chakraborty, Gupta, and Harbaugh, 2002; Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2003). While seller statements
about the values of their goods are normally suspect, ordinal signals can be part of an equilibrium
strategy since they simultaneously reveal both good and bad information. For instance, if a seller
provides estimated valuations for a set of goods the ordinal information might be credible even if the
cardinal information is not. Compared to simultaneous auctions, sequential auctions are better at
revealing ordinal information even when the only signal between periods is the price. The impression
eﬀect from observation of the ﬁrst period price expands the range in which a pure strategy equilibrium
exists, and thereby expands the range in which the sequencing strategy can credibly reveal information.
178A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 Condition (5) is equivalent to showing that E[Pk(Xk,τ H)−Pk(Xk,τ L)|Sk]
is non-decreasing in Sk, which from (3) is equivalent to showing that E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ H) −
vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ L)|Sk] is non-decreasing in Sk.W el o o kf o rs u ﬃcient conditions for this to hold.
From (1),
vk(Xik,Y ik,T k)=E[V (Xik,{Y
j






ik},s)Pr[Sk = s|Xik,Y ik,T k].
Then





ik},s){Pr[S = s|Xik,Y ik,τ H] − Pr[S = s|Xik,Y ik,τ L]}
=[ V (Xik,{Y
j
ik},H) − V (Xik,{Y
j
ik},L)]{Pr[H|Xik,Y ik,τ H] − Pr[H|Xik,Y ik,τ L]}.
(14)










Sk∈{H,L} f(τH|s,s0)f(Xik,Y ik|Sk)f(Sk0,S k)
=
λ1f(Xik,Y ik|H)
λ1f(Xik,Y ik|H)+( 1− λ1)f(Xik,Y ik|L)
(15)
where
λ1 ≡ Pr[Sk = H|Tk = τH]=1− (1 − λ)2




λ2f(Xik,Y ik|H)+( 1− λ2)f(Xik,Y ik|L)
(16)
where
λ2 ≡ Pr[Sk = H|Tk = τL]=λ2.





and deﬁne the function
h(l) ≡
2λ(1 − λ)l
[λ1l +( 1− λ1)][λ2l +( 1− λ2)]
. (18)
From (14)—(18),
18E[{V (Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,H) − V (Z2k,Z 2k,...,Z nk,L)}h(l(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk))|Sk] (19)
needs to be non-decreasing in Sk. Under condition (ID) the ﬁrst expression in braces inside the ex-
pectation is non-decreasing in each of its last n arguments. Further, by aﬃliation, the likelihood ratio
l(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk) is also non-decreasing in each argument. By aﬃliation, it then suﬃces to show that
h(l) is non-decreasing in l. It can easily be veriﬁed that h0(l) > 0i fa n do n l yi f
l<
s
(1 − λ)2(1 − λ2)
(1 − (1 − λ)2)λ2.
Let λ be such that v u u t(1 − λ)2(1 − λ
2
)
(1 − (1 − λ)2)λ
2 =s u p
x,y1,...,yn−1∈Xn
l(x,y1,...,yn−1).
Since the left-hand side of the expression above is continuous and monotonically decreasing in λ, equal
t o0a tλ =1 , and approaching inﬁnity as λ goes to 0, and since the right-hand side is bounded away
from inﬁnity by assumption, such a λ exists by the intermediate value theorem.
Proof of Lemma 1: Impression Eﬀect Recall that, when the only signal that buyers of good
k observe is Tk, the expected price of good k conditional on the seller’s signal Sk = s ∈ {H,L}, given
a realized value τ ∈ {τH,τ L} of Tk is
E[Pk(Xk,τ)|Sk = s]=E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ)|Sk = s].
















By independence of the random variables related to good k from good k0 the density of Ψk0 conditional












For realizations Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1,T k = τ, deﬁne the function
b vk(x,y1,...,yn−1,τ) ≡ E[E[v∗
k(x,y1,...,yn−1,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0]|Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1,T k = τ].
By aﬃliation of Sk0 with Ψk0 and the monotonicity of v∗








= E[b vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ)|Sk = s]
≥ E[E[v∗
k(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0 = L]|Sk = s]
= E[v∗
k(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0 = L,Sk = s]
= E[Pk(Xk,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0 = L,Sk = s].
Similarly,
E[Pk(Xk,τ)|Sk = s]
= E[b vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ)|Sk = s]
≤ E[E[v∗
k(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0 = H]|Sk = s]
= E[v∗
k(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Z nk,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0 = H,Sk = s]
= E[Pk(Xk,τ,Ψk0)|Sk0 = H,Sk = s].
This concludes the proof. ¥




Tk = τ and Sk0 = s0, deﬁne the functions
v∗∗
k (x,y1,...,yn−1,τ,s 0) ≡ E[Vik|Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1,T k = τ,Sk0 = s0] (20)
and
vm
k (x,y1,...,yn−1) ≡ E[Vik|Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1]. (21)
We start with the proof of (i). Note ﬁrst that the expected second period price under the BFF
strategy is higher when second period buyers actually directly observe the seller’s ﬁrst period signal
than when they only observe the ﬁrst period price:
E[Pk(Xk,τ L,Ψk0)] ≤ E[v∗∗
k (Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk,τ L,S k0)] (22)
as the signal {τL,S k0} contains more information about Sk than the signal {τL,Ψk0} (see Theorem 13
in Milgrom and Weber (1982a)).
Furthermore, for ﬁxed x,y1,...,yn−1 and τ = τL,
v∗∗
k (x,y1,...,yn−1,τ L,s 0)=E[Vik|Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1,T k = τL,S k0 = s0]
≤ E[Vik|Xik = x,Y 1
ik = y1,...,Y
n−1
ik = yn−1,S k0 = s0]






20where the inequality follows from aﬃliation of Tk with the other random variables related to good k,
the next equality follows from the fact that Sk0 is independent of Sk (and contains information about
Sk only in conjunction with τk)a n dt h el a s te q u a l i t yi sd e ﬁnitional. Thus,
E[v∗∗
k (Z2k,Z 2k,...,Z nk,τ L,S k0)] ≤ E[vm
k (Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk)]. (23)
Finally, note that
E[Pk(Xk,τ H)] = E[vk(Z2k,Z 2k,...,Z nk,τ H)] ≥ E[vm
k (Z2k,Z 2k,...,Znk)] (24)
as
vk(z2,z 2,...,zn,τ H)=E[Vik|Xik = z2,Y1
ik = z2,...,Y n
ik = zn,T k = τH]
≥ E[Vik|Xik = z2,Y1




where the inequality follows from aﬃliation. From (22)–(24) we conclude that (i) holds.
The proof of (ii) is similar and that of (iii) follows immediately from symmetry and the inability of
the mixed strategy to reveal information. ¥
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